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Abstract: Much discussion of interdisciplinarity shows one or more of the following 
defects: 1. conceptual confusion - lack of a refined and consistent set of terms for 
analysing interdisciplinarity and its variants; 2. utopianism - lack of realism about 
constraints and possibilities in the social organization of science; 3. monism - advocacy of 
a single simple organizational model, rather than a complex heterogeneous model with 
multiple niches, nodes and forms of interaction. The paper presents a more refined, 
realistic, and pluralistic approach to interdisciplinarity. It does this with special reference 
to development studies, whose interest in long-run change and common combination of a 
case-focus and policy-orientation guide it strongly to interdisciplinarity; and to problems 
raised by the dominant economics conception of itself as a self-sufficient alpha-status 
discipline. The paper conceptualizes a range of types of interdisciplinarity, and considers 
how far exemplars of each—such as social capital theory and entitlements analysis—offer 
‘bridging capital’, accessible paths to effective social analysis. 
  
1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The need to avoid a fixed, let alone a single, disciplinary frame for conceiving and 
considering situations acquires special importance in development studies, in order to deal 
with cases in their own right, their own complexity, not by imposition of oversimplified 
universal models from a metropolis. Development studies has used interdisciplinarity as 
legitimation for its distinctive organizational space. Sustaining that claim to legitimacy is 
neither simple nor always attended to, though the organizational space ultimately depends 
on it. Speaking of one of the first development studies institutes, van Nieuwenhuijze 
recalled that ‘In starting the Institute of Social Studies [in The Hague in 1952] it seemed 
feasible to build an organization that offered the least impediments to budding 
interdisciplinarity' (1979:58). Reviewing the institute's first 25 years he regretted that: 
‘The various disciplines have shown little interaction. Economists have by and large 
"done their thing"..’ (1979:59). Aware of arguments for development studies as a field 
with a global interdisciplinary perspective, providing a window on the emergent One 
World, he warned that such a claim will ‘be held to ridicule unless [it] proves effectively 
innovative’ (p.62). 
 This paper examines rationales, problems, and varieties in interdisciplinarity, to 
give a realistic perspective on its prospects and roles. It synthesizes and extends earlier 
discussions on interdisciplinarity and development studies, such as by Hettne, McNeill, 
Norgaard and Seers, and places them in broader methodological context.  
Inter-disciplinarity concerns interaction between disciplines. This covers many 
patterns of activity and outcome, which need to be distinguished, not moved between 
opportunistically in discussion. Lack of a consistent and insightful terminology can be 
fatal when competing interests and strong emotions enter. The term is mostly used 
loosely, including by many an individual author, to mean various different things, such 
as: multi-disciplinarity (MD), knowing and/or using something of more than one disci-
pline; poly-disciplinarity, the mastery of more than one discipline by a person; mega-
disciplinarity, synthesis of disciplines into a mega-framework; or trans-disciplinarity, 
the transcendence of standardized frameworks. Some authors treat interdisciplinarity 
(ID) as an unattainable ideal of mega- or poly-disciplinarity (e.g. Johnson, 1986; Dogan 
& Pahre, 1990; Easton, 1991), or as a synonym for InDiscipline, though this picture of 
ID Studies programs is remote from their best practice.
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 Interdisciplinarity must be judged by its fruits. Some surveys report the greater 
fruitfulness of ‘cross-border research’, work at an intersection of perspectives (e.g. 
Gerstein et al., 1988; Dogan, 2000). In possible contrast, the prominent Harvard 
development economist and China specialist, Dwight Perkins, warned that: ‘There is a 
long, long history of the failure of multi-disciplinary work’ (cited by Norbye, 1992:154). 
He held that multi-disciplinarity (MD) is required for many policy problems, but may not 
fit theory building. Section 2 will start from Glenn Johnson’s similar claim of the need to 
recognize three modes of social research: traditional disciplinary research led by methods 
and theory; case-oriented research, led by pressure to understand a specific situation, not 
only selected aspects; and policy/practical-problem oriented research, led by pressure to 
respond to a perceived life problem. In the latter two modes, there are strong reasons for 
ID and MD work. We then go further, to see the case for ID in much general explanatory 
work too. One cannot in general sustain a claim of separate, only occasionally interacting, 
‘social’, ‘political’, ‘economic’ and 'physical’ aspects. In the environment-and-
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development field for example, the deeper insights and greater adequacy of inter-
disciplinary work appear glaring, to those with the commitment and skills to read it. But 
deciding what are cost-effective forms and levels of inter-action requires careful thought.  
 Understanding ID requires understanding disciplinarity, and considering how 
science works as a social, psychological, organizational enterprise. Section 3 considers the 
nature of disciplines and the constraints and requirements implied for ID. Mainstream 
economics receives special attention because of its problematic engagement in ID, in fact 
proneness to resist it (Lipton, 1970:12), and the significance of this tension within 
development studies.  
 Section 4 looks at possibilities for promoting and implementing ID. We need in 
particular better language to discuss and facilitate various types of ID. A proximate 
objective of the paper is to provide a sharper picture of types and of relevant niches, roles, 
and constraints. An old and still useful image is ‘building and using bridges', which draws 
on ‘the island metaphor’ noted by Berge & Powell (1997) and is more optimistic than the 
‘cactus metaphor’ for disciplines. Cactus deserts, bridge-connected archipelagi, poly- and 
multi-disciplinarity (joint use of multiple separate disciplines) are far from the only 
relations. (Klein, 1996, and Salter & Hearn, 1996, illustrate many others.) We should 
recognise and promote a complex intellectual ‘ecosystem’ with multiple legitimate types 
of life-form, sub-system, and of interaction of ideas, inquirers and users.  
 Section 5 therefore looks at styles of cross-border relations—whether cooperative 
or not, whether marginal or central. It specifies types of inter-disciplinarity and some of 
their respective limitations and attractions. The OECD/CERI classification of 30 years 
ago remains a good starting point, and can be refined. It remains superior to trying to 
handle a mass of variants with one or at most two terms, and quickly leads us to 
interesting comparisons of variants. 
 We need empirically grounded and theorized ideas on factors which favour ID, 
bridge-building and fruitful growth of the intellectual ecosystem. Some suggested steps 
have already been mentioned or implied: distinguishing between modes of research; 
terminological clarification; understanding disciplines as culture-bound islands, dealing 
with whose natives demands special skills; promotion of some shared values or (as in 
much practical problem-solving work) shared incentives or pressures or experience - 
‘common interests’ in various senses; and building and using mutually accessible 
intellectual formats. Section 6 focuses on types of 'bridging capital’, intellectual 
frameworks to promote interaction and mutual deepening. With reference to the special 
need in development studies to bring and keep economics in fuller conversation with 
other disciplines, it asks what makes some bridges feel accessible and yet not too crude, 
entice rather than repel.  
 
  
3 
2.  THE RATIONALES OF I.D. AND A FIRST MAPPING OF THE ECO-
SYSTEM 
 
What are the grounds for interdisciplinarity? We open with a common picture of kinds of 
research, which links ID to case-focused or policy-focused research. For at least those 
purposes disciplinary loyalists must work with other disciplines: this is ‘exogenous’ ID 
(OECD, 1982). We see however that the rationale of this link also justifies much, 
'endogenous’, ID in general explanatory-oriented research. We then enrich this picture 
with Wallerstein's historical perspective of how the conventional disciplinary divisions in 
social science emerged and continue to evolve. The conventional divisions remain 
dominant but have been significantly modified at the margins in the past two generations. 
We examine how these rationales of ID are reflected in development studies, one of the 
margins which emerged post-1945, and some of the challenges it faces to sustain its ID 
aspirations.  
 
Purposes of research: theory-oriented, situation-oriented, policy-oriented 
 
If one wishes to understand a particular person, group, locality, or country, one must 
become ‘interdisciplinary’, attend to a variety of aspects and how they interrelate. If one 
wants to study the impact of say economic structural adjustment on India, Yugoslavia or 
Rwanda, one cannot sensibly ignore political impacts, plus their feedbacks into economic 
life. In studying any country, qua country or even only qua ‘economy', one cannot ignore 
the possibility that economic power will be converted into political power, through 
campaign funding, favours, bribes, media control, acquisition of greater knowledge, and 
other means, and that this in turn will affect economic systems. If one studies the impacts 
of education in and on, say, Kerala one cannot sensibly ignore cultural impacts, such that 
almost no one with a certain amount of schooling will do heavy manual work: a major 
economic fact.  
 Similar considerations apply when we consider ID in policy-oriented research. 
Much of this is a special case of situation-focused research, though some policy work 
aspires to widely applicable generalizations. The complexity of policy cases frequently 
exceeds the grasp of discipline-gained knowledge, even when brought together from 
various disciplines. Much ID is in response to life-problem situations where we cannot 
wait for eventual discipline-gained knowledge. Such work may sometimes then not be 
tidy or conventionally scientific rewarding, but it requires sophisticated skills of 
judgement, selection and synthesis (Brewer, 1999; Rein & Schőn, 1994). 
 Glenn Johnson, a distinguished agricultural and development economist, was also 
an unusually reflective methodologist (e.g. Johnson & Zerby, 1973). His book Research 
Methodology for Economists - Philosophy and Practice distinguishes three modes of 
research—positive, evaluative and prescriptive—and three possible purposes: to generate 
theory, to obtain case-illumination, and to support action (the last two often coexist). 
From this I derive Figure 1. The elucidation of the modes and the illustrative contents in 
the boxes are mine; the ‘disciplinary’ and ‘subject matter’ labels are Johnson’s.2  
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Figure 1: 
Types of research, 
classified by purpose and 
mode  
(based on Johnson, 1986) 
PURPOSES OF RESEARCH 
 
‘DISCIPLINARY’ (in 
Johnson’s sense of 
having a general-
theory orientation) 
 
‘SUBJECT-MATTER’ 
(description/ 
explanation of a specific 
issue/ situation/ case/ 
location) 
 
PRACTICAL 
PROBLEM-
SOLVING 
 
 
 
 
 
KINDS 
 
 
OF 
 
 
KNOW-
LEDGE 
 
 
CLAIM 
 
POSITIVE 
(more neutral 
description & 
explanation) 
 
E.g.: core 
economics;  
or the sociologies of 
economics, of law, of 
ethics 
 
E.g. area studies, much 
history, some biography 
 
As a contributory 
component, basis for 
prescriptive work; 
including in the 
absence of mature 
general theory 
 
EVALUATIVE 
 
E.g. ethics: theories 
of the good 
 
E.g. much history and 
biography; strategy 
review. 
 
E.g. program 
evaluation.  
And as a basis for 
prescriptive work. 
 
PRESCRIPTIVE 
 
E.g. ethics: theories 
of the right; and 
some general legal 
theory 
 
From Johnson’s 
definition, ‘subject-
matter’ work is ‘seldom 
prescriptive’ (p.212); 
but in fact the case- and 
problem-solving 
orientations can co-exist 
 
Prescriptive-problem 
work: e.g. 
prescriptive policy 
analysis, legal 
casework 
 
Johnson’s classification gives a worthwhile starting point, but not all disciplines are 
centred on theory. We can identify ‘subject-matter’ focused, and problem-solving 
focused, disciplines; e.g. in the first category, history or Chinese studies, and in the 
second, engineering and law, which can also be seen as families of disciplines.  
 Various practice-oriented fields have tried to be, like engineering and law, 
simultaneously a profession and an academic discipline, but not all with as much success. 
Public administration and urban-&-regional planning, to take two important examples, are 
better seen as ‘interdisciplinary fields’ (Gasper, 1990, 2000a)3; so too is development 
studies. Public administration works at the crossroads of several disciplines and a set of 
practical demands. Compared to general management it requires stronger involvement 
also from law, history and economics, and cannot be simply a sub-discipline of 
management or political science. Whereas disciplines can attain a high degree of 
enclosure around self-defined concepts, methods and questions, and leave aside matters 
not convenient to this disciplinary matrix, a practically oriented, maid-servant (or public 
servant) enterprise like public administration should never adopt such a prioritization of 
tidiness above usefulness. It has to draw on various types of understanding to tackle 
various types of pressing and inter-connected real issue; it links material from different 
fields without unifying them (Gasper, 2000a). It never has been, and never should be, a 
unified discipline: ‘Integration does not so much result in a coherent body of knowledge 
but points at a process of continuously striving for the confrontation of diverging 
approaches in order to better understand some apect of (what constitutes) administrative 
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reality.... integration not only results in bridge building between theories but also points at 
unbridgeable differences’ between their underlying perspectives (Rutgers, 1998: 561-2).  
 An interdisciplinary field is inevitably marked by competing definitions and 
conceptions. This helps to explain the failure, even more than for general management, to 
make public administration a closed profession with well-defined compulsory entry 
conditions. Full consensus on disciplinary identity and location is in fact unnecessary: we 
can gain through competition of ideas, and there are many legitimate intellectual bases, 
from various disciplines and the schools within them, so that room exists in public 
administration for diverse specializations and niches (Gasper, 2000a).  
 In seeking to persuade a disciplinary economics audience of the value of ID, 
Johnson presented it only as for case-focused and practical problem-solving research. But 
for purely explanatory purposes too the case for ID often stands: the limits of any one 
disciplinary view, the need for a broader perspective. If one cannot respectably analyse the 
results of structural adjustment in Yugoslavia or Rwanda while ignoring their (disastrous) 
political—and hence also economic—impacts (Woodward, 1995; Uvin, 1999), nor 
education in Kerala while ignoring the indirect economic impacts of mass aversion to 
menial work, nor the results of economic liberalism while ignoring the impacts of massive 
concentrations of wealth  upon politics and conflict, nor can one do so in an adequate 
theory of economic adjustment or economic development. Seers argued this forcefully a 
quarter of a century back, and Myrdal before him. Hayek warned that ‘the economist who 
is only an economist is likely to become a nuisance if not a positive danger’ (1956:463). 
Admittedly, to build joint theory is usually harder than to get cooperation on policy related 
cases, where as in an art one creatively relates relevant general tools to a particular time, 
place and case, in contrast to a science where one aspires to capture all or most variation 
within a general formulation. This does not change one’s scepticism about single-
disciplinary abstracted theory. 
 
Disciplinarity and inter-disciplinarity in historical perspective 
 
Johnson's picture takes the now traditional disciplines too much for granted (the first 
substantive cell in Figure 1). Immanuel Wallerstein adds awareness of how they are not 
eternal, but emerged—not identically in all countries—and are evolving; notably in the 
Report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences which 
he chaired (Wallerstein et al., 1996). I summarize the report's vision in Figure 2. It 
highlights four conventional, established divides in the terrain of social studies:  
1. past- versus present- oriented;  
2. whether the focus is on supposedly ‘modern’ or ‘non-modern’ societies, as seen from 
Europe (Europe and its offshoots and posited precursors, versus the rest of the world);  
3. nomothetic (seeking general laws) versus idiographic (seeking knowledge of unique 
cases); and  
4. economics versus political science versus sociology: the three main nomothetic, 
present- and 'modern'-oriented distillates which fractionated out from more integrated 
social studies in the late 19th or early 20th centuries. (Political science has however 
been less nomothetic than sociology or especially economics.) 
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 Figure 2: Wallerstein's anatomy and genealogy of modern social studies  
 NOMOTHETIC IDIOGRAPHIC 
PRESENT 
ORIENTED 
I. ‘Modern 
societies' 
 
 
 
 
II. ‘Pre-modern 
societies' 
 
- “The Triad”, the outcome of 19thC. 
evolution of European social thought: 
1. Economics: market 
2. Political Science: polity 
3. Sociology: ‘society’ 
 
- Post 1945 expansions of the Triad to 
discuss the non-European world 
 
- Cultural studies & newer 
anthropology (which have somewhat 
undermined the old social sciences v. 
humanities division) 
 
- Some older-style anthropology / 
ethnography (but some other 
anthropology became nomothetic) 
 
Emergent cross-
cutting sub-fields, 
across the past- 
present divide, etc. 
Post 1945 mushrooming of overlap sub-fields (e.g. quantitative economic 
history) which span one or more of the four divides: 1. past/present oriented;  2. 
‘modern/ non-modern’ societies; 3. nomothetic/idiographic;  4. 
economics/politics/sociology.    Much work in such sub-fields (like economic 
anthropology) and cross-fields—area studies, development studies, etc.—has 
been concerned with coming to terms with (and keeping tabs on) particular ‘non-
modern societies’, no longer left for the ghettos of Orientalism and ethnography. 
PAST ORIENTED 
I. ‘Modern 
societies' 
 
II. ‘Pre-modern 
societies' 
 
- Economic history 
 
- Post 1960 expansion of the field of 
attention of  economic history 
 
 
  
 
- History 
 
- 1. ‘Classics' (about the supposed 
precursors of the modern) 
- 2.  Orientalisms (study of the 
supposed non-precursors); partly  
absorbed now into area studies and 
the broadening historical focus of 
formerly overwhelmingly present-
oriented fields 
 NOMOTHETIC IDIOGRAPHIC 
 
Wallerstein et al. emphasise the conditionality and changeability of disciplinary 
boundaries. Science appears as partly driven by power and rewards, and by whatever 
types of data are created and available, and thus directly and indirectly by the needs of 
states and the types of study they have encouraged. ‘Nearly all social scientists assumed 
[that] political boundaries fixed the spatial parameters of other key interactions - the 
sociologist's society, the macroeconomist's national economy, the political scientist's 
polity, the historian's nation.... social science was very much a creature, if not a creation, 
of the states, taking their boundaries as crucial social containers' (pp.26-7). With the 
expansion of the ‘three [main] nomothetic social sciences into the non-Western world, 
these areas too became subject to state-centric analyses. The key post-1945 concept of 
"development" referred first and foremost to the development of each state, taken as an 
individual entity’ (p.81). 'Human Development' thinking and International Political 
Economy may nowadays diverge from this.  
 The Gulbenkian Commission thus highlight the efflorescence of work since the 
1950s which in one or other way crosses the standard lines, though they doubt whether it 
is enough. Building on work by Jean Piaget, Dogan & Pahre (1990) consider this trend in 
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detail, under the name of hybridization. They see an unending cycle leading to ever 
more specialized but ever more cross-fertilized study areas. Scientific fields show 
continually growing specialization, narrowing of focus, and sub-division: the creation 
of sub-disciplines. This produces deeper work, but also leaves gaps and progressively 
encounters diminishing returns. Innovators then identify higher returns from cross-
border hybridization with another specialized fraction, often from another discipline. A 
new, more specialized, sub-field emerges; and the cycle then repeats, again and again. 
Dogan & Pahre conclude with ‘no recommendations’ (p.230), but in fact simply and 
strongly advocate recognition of the specialization-hybridization cycle as desirable and 
inevitable. Inter-specialization interaction is a dynamizing, enriching, crucial aspect of 
science (see likewise Klein, 1996; Salter & Hearn, 1996). Whereas the type of ID 
service work advocated by Johnson is usually seen as in the long run parasitic on strong 
disciplines, the disciplines are in fact themselves dependent on cross-fertilization from 
ID work (Hansson, 1999). 
 Wallerstein et al. in contrast are worried ‘that the concession of “inter-
disciplinarity” has served as much to salvage the legitimacy of the existing disciplines as 
to overcome the waning logic of their distinctiveness. [They and others] have urged a 
more radical reconstruction to overcome what they perceive as intellectual confusion’ 
(p.47). Further, hybrid fields flourish when resources are plentiful. When scarcity bites, 
the old established disciplines try to bite first, so one can no longer avoid the issue of how 
to reconstruct them (p.96). However, the disciplines possess organizational clout and 
large power bases from stock teaching, and declare that they have deepened and become 
more subtle since the 1950s when the need was felt for transcending them via area studies 
and inter-disciplinary fields.  
 
The challenges for development studies 
 
Development studies combines Johnson's grounds for ID: extensive case-/situation- 
orientation and policy-orientation, and Wallerstein's: the need for a broad view on a 
world too complex and interconnected to be adequately described by single disciplines. 
For Björn Hettne, in his Development Theory and the Three Worlds, development 
studies is ‘a problem-oriented, applied and inter-disciplinary field, analysing social 
change in a world context [of material disparities], but with due consideration to the 
specificity of different societies in terms of history, ecology, culture, etc.' (p.4, 1990 
edition); it is typically marked by normative and policy concerns (1995:12).
4
 While 
19th century social science often retained much of that orientation, even if 
Eurocentrically, it was gradually largely replaced by more abstracted, static and 
compartmentalized work. Much post Second World War work on and in low-income 
countries found it had to transcend this now mainstream social science. Contributions 
came both from Southern intellectuals and practitioners who found problematic the 
divisions of intellectual labour established to describe the reproduction of mature 
industrial capitalist societies, and from Northerners on the periphery of those 
disciplines. In the present phase, the overwhelmingly Third World focus of 
development studies declines as old definitions of ‘Worlds' dissolve, but its approaches 
acquire broader application, found to be necessary in North and East too - a view 
championed by Dudley Seers.5 Crude application of neo-liberal and modernization 
theory in the former Communist world, for example, can produce the sorts of crises and 
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reactions seen earlier in the South. The disintegration of the former Yugoslavia is a 
prime illustration of effects outside an economics field of vision, in the wake of easy 
loans in the 1970s, soaring 1980s interest rates and then a crudely enforced structural 
adjustment (Woodward, 1995).  
 Development theory's significance is thus, according to Hettne, as ‘a precursor... 
[and] catalyst... forcing the excessively specialized and static social sciences to focus on 
development and change... [and return to] the classical tradition of a unified historical 
social science' (1995:xiii), though now on new, non-Eurocentric, foundations. Harriss 
(1999) argues similarly, with the illustration of how economic and social planning for 
India were hobbled by failure to see the implications of introduction of political 
democracy in a pre-industrial and hence rich-peasant dominated country. He regrets that 
much of development economics has never perceived the need for a broadened field of 
vision.  
 Hettne recognised the predominance from around 1980 of neoclassical economics 
and Anglo-American managerialism. But development studies was not ‘a "discipline" 
in disintegration' (1995:249). Recognition around the world will continue to grow of the 
social requirements and impacts of markets and economic growth, and of their human 
and ecological costs. Further, development studies has always needed to be an inter-
disciplinary field intellectually, not a separate discipline, even more so when defined ‘in 
terms of problems rather than countries' (p.287). It will neither consolidate as a separate 
discipline nor wither. Given the disciplines' internal preoccupations and norms, and that 
the needs in low-income countries are ‘still, and for good reasons, regarded as the core 
area of development problems' (p.265), he advised that it was not ‘time to give up [the 
development studies] space [organizationally]. Rather it is important to defend it 
against the rising wave of monodisciplinary fundamentalism…' (p.286). 
 Having considered rationales for interdisciplinary approaches, we must consider the 
constraints set by the rationales and practices of disciplinarity. Subsequently we look 
for feasible steps forward. 
 
3. THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SCIENCE  
 
Understanding disciplinarity, as a basis for understanding and attempting 
interdisciplinarity 
 
The terms ‘discipline' and ‘disciple' are not close by coincidence; nor are the two 
meanings of ‘discipline’ accidental twins, as Foucault and others have underlined.6 
‘Disciplines’ contain social as well as intellectual formations. They are organized 
groups or networks which discipline members and students—by rewards, punishments 
and bestowal/withdrawal of identity and recognition—to create disciples. In this sense 
they are successors to the priestly orders. They seduce as well as drill, providing to 
young people of an impressionable age a nest, a community, a style and set of habits, a 
gradual induction to mysteries, and many intellectual rewards from the excitement and 
tractability of the bounded puzzle. For a variety of reasons, treated by theorists of 
science such as Kuhn (1970) and Ravetz (1973), an in-depth rather than in-breadth 
approach is often functional and even necessary. In cases when this is not so, disciplines 
sometimes discourage exploratory work which crosses borders, in order to maintain 
their territories.  
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 Sheldon Rotblatt (1999) defends disciplinarity as a system that shields academic 
freedom against political domination: it asserts the existence of areas of deep and 
organized knowledge which is established and to be governed by scientific criteria only. 
Universities are indeed cradles of disciplinarity, given their roles as a machinery for 
validating suitability for entry to professional paths and in the socialization of the next 
generation of academic teachers; given too the incentive structures for academics to 
play safe after and even during their PhD studies and publish prolifically by doing detail 
work (Earl, 1983). By basing the structures for research on the structure for training, 
most universities constrain that research. Co-operation in teaching is sometimes harder 
still, thanks partly to turf- and budget-defence. Academics frequently have little or 
nothing to do with their colleagues on the same campus from supposedly sister 
disciplines. 
 The depth and virulence of disciplinary chauvinism is in many ways surprising. 
Consider the struggles common within joint sociology-anthropology departments: Giri 
(1998) cites several instances which led to splitting, and one can add others. Even after 
having established their own territories, flags and passports, disciplines continue to 
often have poor relations with some others: to largely ignore and (yet) disparage each 
other (Salter & Hearn 1996: 157). The generalist-linker is typically a role with low 
status. Why a closed rather than an open disciplinarity? Reasons might include the 
arrogance of science; fear of the unknown; single-discipline social science first degrees; 
the defence of departmental budgets (so that conflicts with one’s closest neighbours 
tend to be fiercest); and the delightful convenience of disciplinarity, like bureaucracy, 
for those who can then ignore most aspects of other people's situations. 
 In addition, we should note three fundamental factors. First, the social science 
disciplines have historically emerged as in some respects competitors rather than 
partners. Second, disciplines are cultures, and cultures differ; relatedly, they provide 
‘homes’, bases of identity. Third, disciplinary boundary setting is often underpinned, 
especially in economics, by a ‘Newtonian’ ontology which declares that the whole is 
the sum of the parts, which can therefore each be examined separately. 
 First, the social science disciplines and fields did not grow as partners. Aidan 
Foster-Carter argues that the social sciences are competitors for dominance, not a chain 
of emergent subsets like physics-chemistry-biology. They represent competing 
perspectives, some of which may consider that they can cover everything or subsume 
the others as special cases. And: ‘Each and every specialization was started in response 
to incidental historical events or circumstances. Problematic issues were taken up, and 
when the going was good the effort expanded, regardless of others’ (van 
Nieuwenhuijze, 1978:18). Little reference was made to each other's roles.  
 Secondly, disciplines are cultures and cross-cultural contact is problem-ridden and 
demanding (Schoenberger, 2001). The different styles of writing between different 
social sciences, and between natural and social sciences, form one barrier (Salter & 
Hearn, 1996; McNeill, 1999). Economics uses the style of the detective story: 
characters of restricted depth interact in intricate but standardized ways. For some 
readers this is a delight, for others a bore. Analysis of these genre differences, including 
of root metaphors and key exemplar cases and illustrations in different disciplines, 
might improve mutual awareness and communication. (See e.g. the work of Apthorpe, 
McCloskey, and Roe.) 
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 Relatedly, disciplines often serve as bases of personal identity. Consider two 
stances. In stance A my discipline/training is my allegiance (a choice comparable to 
that of Jesuit versus Dominican), my noun-expressed identity (‘I am an economist’), a 
caste-mark, for life. In stance B my (original) discipline/affiliation/ label/training is one 
of many relevant adjectives or descriptive clauses about my background (‘I trained in 
economics, thirty years ago’). Stance B is healthier, including for inter-disciplinarity; 
but stance A is common, probably more common. ID works more readily when people 
act as representatives not of disciplines but of themselves, their experiences, values and 
insights. Rajni Kothari (cited by Giri, 1998) argues that the key step in ID is formation 
of a community of conversers who each seek to cross and maybe transcend 
conventional bounds: 'For true interdisciplinarity to develop, it is the individual that has 
to become inter-disciplinary, not the group'. Since disciplines can become sources of 
personal identity, advice to treat ID as a follow-on phase in education, after people have 
first been immersed overwhelmingly in one discipline, is problematic. In addition the 
pressures of professional life after PhD studies make acquisition at that stage of 
adequate grounding in other disciplines less likely. 
 Thirdly, several authors argue that disciplinarity reflects dominant premises in 
modern Western thought, accepted due to their immense success in parts of the physical 
sciences. Following Norgaard (1994:62-5), the first two are: (i) Atomism: systems 
consist of unchanging parts, and a system is the sum of those parts; and (ii) Mechanism: 
relations between the parts do not change. Given such premises, a disciplinary field of 
study may take most things as exogenous, constant, separable, unaffected by the 
remaining things which the discipline does consider. The other premises, particularly 
influential in economics, are as follows: (iii) Universalism: the same parts and inter-
relations apply for all cases, everywhere. (iv) Objectivism: people acting on systems are 
not parts of the systems they seek to understand and act on. (v) Monism: there is one 
correct way to understand a system; any plurality of ways will merge into a bigger 
picture; so the various sciences will fit together without any fundamental difficulties. 
Each of these premises is adequate in the older parts of physics, but not for complex 
systems involving people.
7
 
 Much of economics can be even more fiercely monist: it may not recognize 
other valuable ways to view an economic or human system (Söderbaum, 2000). Thus, 
in contrast to in other social sciences, only one paradigm, neo-classical economics, is 
now taught in many economics departments, let alone much on other disciplines and 
mutual roles; and forms of neo-classicism seek to become imperial also beyond 
economics (Fine, 1999a).  
 
The special case of mainstream economics 
 
‘Anyone who works in an interdisciplinary way is considered a bad economist’, reports 
the prominent environmental economist David Pearce (in Ravaioli, 1995:26). 
Discussion of ID in social sciences and development studies remains politely vague, 
and the later treatment of ‘bridging capital’ unfocussed, unless we recognise that 
difficulties in this area more commonly involve economists than human geographers or 
anthropologists or even most sociologists, political scientists and cultural studies folk. 
For sustainable development, ecologists are far better trained to consider systems which 
cross traditional science boundaries than are most economists. Mainstream economics’ 
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box of tools, boundary-markers and standardized formulations dominates many of its 
practitioners: ‘Elegant error is often preferred to messy truth. Theoretical tractability is 
often preferred to empirical relevance', regrets Richard Lipsey in a major critique by a 
troubled elder statesman (2001:169). The economics mainstream constitutes a special 
problem in inter-disciplinarity given a combination of comparatively poor ‘external 
relations' with other sciences, assumptions often chosen for convenience more than 
realism, and yet strong policy-orientation and influence. 
 Economics has greater problems in its relations with other social sciences than 
we see at other social science interfaces. Its universalist claims, the absence of stated 
limits to its reach, typically produce a weak concern for history and qualitative change; 
while its achievements sometimes induce a superiority complex, seen for example in 
some interviews in Swedberg (1990). Yet the famous economists interviewed by 
Swedberg were clearly worse read in sociology than their sociology counterparts were 
in economics. The pattern is characteristic: citation patterns indicate that economists 
import little (Dogan & Pahre, 1990). While only a minority hold an explicit vision of 
economics as the master social science—the science of choice in general, able to absorb 
the other fields—most economists do not see their subject as only one perspective 
amongst other social and human studies with which they vitally must interact. 
Education in other fields often early on situates the field in relation to others (see for 
example the classic sociology textbook by Tom Bottomore); economics textbooks do 
not.8
 
Even some economists who practice ID, learning from other areas, formally decry 
the notion, perhaps identifying it with mega- or trans-disciplinarity or just indiscipline. 
 Economics seems to have problems on other frontiers too. Natural scientists can 
find its assumptions and methodology odd (as reported in Anderson et al., 1988; 
Waldrop, 1993): the common insistence that its core presumptions are not supersedable 
or in need of testing, priority to abstracted deduction above broader empirical 
exploration, and failure to collect much of its own data and to converse with people. 
 Yet no other social science matches economics' long history, prestige, scale of 
research and membership, and influence. In a money-based and growth-fixated world, 
societies are routinely referred to as ‘economies’ and the world itself often becomes 
‘the world economy’. Economics is uninhibited in policy advice by feelings of being 
polluted or demeaned; on the contrary, it gives policy advice high status. Gunnar 
Myrdal examined the contrast here with other social sciences, and Salter & Hearn add 
that most natural scientists too shy away from the common demand in policy discourse 
for radical simplification. Whereas: 'Economists often prefer theories that produce 
unambiguous policy results over theories that do not, irrespective of their relative 
evidential bases’ (Lipsey, 2001:169). Economics has no explicit scientist-versus-
engineer distinction: economists are supposed capable to both theorize and prescribe. In 
policy debate an absolutist style—emphatic proclamation of supposed general truths—
often gives them rhetorical advantages (Baker, 1998). Not content to report their 
findings and leave others to use them in policy argumentation, economists frequently 
race on to pen a paragraph or two on 'policy implications', from extremely narrow 
premises and data. To take a standard example, a study of schooling from a respected 
journal (Bedi & Garg, 2000) finds that in Indonesia private school graduates earn more, 
and notes other studies which concluded that these graduates have also learnt more, 
more cost-effectively. The study immediately ‘suggests the need for greater private 
participation in the education sector’, despite having given no attention to issues such as 
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nationbuilding or brain-drain or willingness to work in priority sectors, or possibilities 
for reforming public schools. Underlying mainstream economics' narrow formats for 
policy analysis are typically the prioritization criterion of willingness-and-ability to pay 
in the world economy; and a style of abstraction derived from physical science which 
can become dangerous when applied to social and environmental systems. 
 
Abstraction and its dangers 
 
A 'Newtonian' style of theorizing has contributed to making mainstream economics 
resistant to ID and partial to emphatic one-eyed policy advice. Norgaard, Wallerstein 
and especially Kurien critique the permanent, not just temporary, inattention to key 
socio-political variables, treated in economics as constants. Norgaard observes that: 
‘Five hundred years ago, based on the hypothesis of a relationship between bad blood 
and disease, blood-letting was commonly practiced. We know now that the hypothesis 
had some basis but that the cure lacked a systemic view of the body. And taken to an 
extreme, as it sometimes was, death by blood-letting is certain’ (Norgaard, 1994: 188; 
my italics). Using predictions from highly abstracted economic models as the basis for 
massive social engineering—as in IMF stabilization programmes, World Bank 
structural adjustment policies, and ‘big-bang' transition plans in the former Soviet 
bloc—has been all too close to this. Newtonian abstraction thrived in economics not 
only because of the prestige of Newtonian physics. The particular abstractions used—
from power relations, ownership arrangements, social environment and justice—made 
neo-classical economics a handmaiden of those in power (Kurien, 1996:103), who thus 
provided institutional backing.  
 We must abstract in order to analyse clearly; but we must abstract from 
incidentals, not from essentials, and still not confuse our abstracted models with reality. 
Mainstream economics has often abstracted with priority to its analytical convenience. 
..."the economy" is not an independent entity but something that is mentally carved out for 
purposes of enquiry... not an entity with well-defined boundaries, but always merging with 
other social spheres...  porous at the boundary... always in a state of flux within because it 
is the result of the interaction of diverse social forces…  [There is no precise boundary to 
the economy.] …since the household and the state are constituents of the economy, their 
"non-economic" considerations will seep into the functioning of the economy... [Whereas] 
neo-classical theory slices off the economy completely from the rest of the social processes 
and confers on it an autonomy which it does not have.... [By] insisting on symmetries, 
regularities and uniformities as the essential logical properties of theory, neo-classical 
economics provides a conceptualisation of the economy devoid of its essential features. 
(Kurien, 1996: 56, 144-5) 
Kurien concludes that the economy is an evolving mosaic of units of heterogeneous 
structure and agenda and diverse patterns of interaction, which require case-by-case 
examination and an evolutionary perspective (p.64). But developing and teaching a tidy 
self-enclosed mathematicized body of doctrine that gives clear-cut standardized claims 
is easier than to grapple with this reality. 
 Economics has largely abstracted from the physical world too, as have sociology 
and political science, unlike geography or anthropology: ‘the disciplinary organization 
of knowledge in which economics abstracted from the physical world and focused on 
exchange, exchange value and monetary transactions... [thus] not dealing with the real 
world any more’ (Herman Daly, in Ravaioli 1995:28.) The environment, physical and 
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social, is assumed constant, even if being saturated with pollutants. ‘What economic 
thought exists on the longterm potential for development is either inconsistent with 
knowledge accumulated in the natural sciences or relies on an as yet unidentified [i.e. 
unproven] source of energy’ (Norgaard, 1994:37). While fear of major environmental 
decline has induced a response from economists and institutional backers, the 
mainstream economics mind-set offers considerable resistance. The environment is not 
a compulsory topic in economics training. Many of the top economists interviewed by 
Ravaioli had not read a single book on ecological economics or the environment. The 
topic is often considered relatively trivial intellectually and practically: price signals, 
aided by some internalization of externalities, will convey the required information and 
incentives when appropriate, opined Milton Friedman, Gary Becker and Frank Hahn - 
as if markets were complete and represent the poor and future generations. Attempts to 
change lifestyles and reduce consumption are ‘nothing to do with economists’ 
(Malinvaud, on Ravaioli, p.94), or pointless and/or unacceptable (Friedman; Spaventa); 
as are attempts to change world distribution, unless and until a catastrophe happens 
(Hahn). 
  When pressed, Ravaioli's mainstream economist interviewees fell back on faith: 
we must simply hope for technological salvation, notably a clean and cheap mass 
energy source; or, in some replies, on disciplinarity itself as justification for not 
considering the physical environment centrally. For Hartje: ‘Most social sciences 
necessarily have a limited perspective.... like any other discipline economics should be 
aware of its limits’ (in Ravaioli, p.134). Being aware of one's limits could mean 
humility as to what one understands, and imply interacting with others, or being 
defensive and having an excuse for remaining restricted and non-interactive. For Hahn: 
‘The right question is one for which you can conceive of an answer’ (Ravaioli, p.67). 
He may presume the criteria of disciplinary research (Johnson's Type 1) for urgent 
concrete and policy problems (Johnson's Types 2 and 3). Even then, should one work in 
one’s familiar disciplinary corner with its familiar types of ‘answer', or interact with 
others who might introduce one to types of answer and question of which one has not 
conceived ? 
 
4.  SUGGESTIONS ARISING FOR INTERDISCIPLINARITY  
 
Grand visions and feasible proposals 
 
Having identified limitations of disciplinarity, some authors make bold calls for 
interdisciplinarity. Norgaard makes a persuasive case for dropping monism, the premise 
that there is one correct way to understand a system. Major ‘participants in processes of 
learning and deciding [must]: 1 - be conscious of their own conceptual frameworks, 2 - 
be conscious of the advantages and disadvantages of the frameworks used by others, 
and 3 - be tolerant of the use of different frameworks...by others’ (p.101). Full 
coherence in the understanding of many issues, e.g. climate change, is ‘inherently 
impossible for the knowledges of the scientists from separate disciplines cover different 
variables, different spatial scales, and different time scales. And multiple incongruent 
patterns of thinking are being used’ (Norgaard, 1994:140), such as the mechanical 
models of physical scientists versus the evolutionary models of biologists. Integration 
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of these partial, limited perspectives should be through a sort of democratic, multi-
cultural politics of science: 
...knowing must be a social process whenever separate disciplinary understandings 
must be merged... [for] the patterns of thinking really are incommensurable... Scientists 
would be obliged to stay abreast of the important findings in the sciences around 
them.. [and] to participate in the sharing of knowledge and the building of the 
collective understandings necessary to work with or to avoid complex problems. 
(Norgaard, 1994: 147-8, 154) 
In Martinez-Alier’s terms, drawn from Otto Neurath, we can essay ‘orchestration of the 
sciences’, bringing them together and interrelating them, without expecting or desiring 
to absorb them all into one discipline (old or new). Some areas of consensus are indeed 
emerging on for example climate change, through intensive interaction of disciplines 
and gradual increase of mutual respect and trust. But Norgaard notes elsewhere (p.102) 
that:  
Any given framework is better understood by, or more appreciated by, or results in 
answers which are more advantageous to some people than others. Any framework that 
has been highly elaborated to stretch its usefulness can only be understood by a few 
who are well informed of its technical details. The use of a single framework, without 
modification for regional differences, facilitates control from a single center of 
analysis. Thus the use of a single framework disenfranchises or disqualifies the 
majority, facilitates the tyranny of technocrats, and encourages centralization. 
This harsher analysis of science identifies a series of major obstacles to broader-based 
understanding. 
 We must take into account the gravitational pull of the disciplines, for reasons 
good and bad. Resistance to ID comes not only from chauvinism, misidentification of 
ID with cafetaria-curricula or polymathism, or views that ID is unnecessary, which we 
addressed earlier. It reflects also concerns that ID fails or is too difficult and costly. 
Lipton (1970) and Berge & Powell (1997) warn for example that each new discipline 
added to a team seriously increases coordination costs, so that one must be very 
selective. This second half of the paper tries to identify manageable proposals and 
working examples.9 
 Wallerstein makes recommendations at two levels. First, a revolutionary vision: 
we should rebuild the social sciences on a new plan: for example, perhaps a division 
between macro (large-scale, long-term social processes) and micro (individual action) 
studies, rather than between economic, political and social; and that all social scientists 
and social science should be historical and sociological and economic (p.96). Secondly, 
he presents suggestions for the shorter-run (pp.103-5): (1) year-long mixed research 
groups at international centres, each on an urgent theme; (2) fixed-term cross-
disciplinary research programs with specific objectives, to test the programs' potential; 
(3) all professors must serve two departments; (4) all research students must have a 
minor, via coursework or research. These arrangements appear relevant and feasible. 
Yet they remain exceptions. Not even schools of development studies routinely practise 
most of them.10 Professorial designations and professional training often remain weak 
for building ID.  
 Johnson's recommendations were based on fuller review of experience from a 
variety of modes and purposes of research. His book stresses the legitimacy and 
importance of multi-disciplinary work, by which he means not only the presence of 
several disciplines but also an open ID interaction in case-focused research and policy 
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research. But since these approaches are demanding, complex and costly, including in 
management terms, subdivision and specialization are sometimes better. Both 
disciplinarity and inter-disciplinarity are legitimate and necessary, separately and in 
research teams. They are also strongly complementary. Kenneth Boulding observed in 
his foreword to Johnson's book that intellectual division of labour brings economies of 
specialization, which as in other cases of specialization must be complemented by inter-
specialization trade if full benefits are to accrue. Interchange need not lead to 
consensus, indeed consensus sometimes hinders intellectual progress; but competing 
views should be formed in awareness of each other, not in mutual ignorance. 
 Boulding did not ask how, if intellectual specialization brings narrowness and 
mercantilist chauvinism, trade will happen. An MD team will not automatically lead to 
interaction. And ID can occur also outside teams, by interaction with those in other 
disciplines through their writings. Some of the best ID work happens within one person 
– a Jon Elster, Albert Hirschman or Tibor Scitovsky. As Kothari saw, true ID requires 
ID individuals, whether in teams or not. Giri (1998, 2002) diagnoses the required shift 
as from a nest of identity as a professional of type T, to a self-conception as pilgrim and 
seeker. We should expect only a modest rate of progress here. Johnson himself 
identified as predisposing factors for effective open inter- (but in his terms, ‘multi-’) 
disciplinary work: being ‘free enough of disciplinary chauvinism’ (p.204) and 
‘philosophically flexible’ (p.205). These factors are neither self-nurturing nor non-
nurturable. Johnson leaves them as exogenous: some people have them, others don’t, so 
pick the first type for certain jobs. We have to do more than this, not least in Johnson's 
own discipline of economics. 
 While being clear on forces of habit and vested interest, a reading of the 
psychology of economics must recognize important space for motivation by puzzle-
solving and social ideals.11  Economics' allure has lain in the promise of combining the 
joys of science—commoditization in modern societies has provided a universe for 
measurement and calculation, in imitation of physics—with the satisfactions of social 
relevance. Highlighting likely contradictions in economics, both internal problems and 
contradictions with other findings, has some influence; for example, showing that 
mainstream economics has an ideology of value pluralism yet has ignored some types 
of value-system. Broadening the methods used and known by economists—by adding 
interviews, group interviews, testimonies, participatory exercises, contingent valuation 
surveys, and involvement in ID projects—often provides evidence incompatible with 
their disciplinary assumptions and contributes to re-thinking.  
 Similarly, one can examine forces of self-interest in economics itself, such that 
economists may choose assumptions that are most convenient for producing papers and 
status, avoid disputes with their funders, and concentrate on manipulating data of 
dubious quality. Norgaard provides this central challenge (1994:124-5). The 
delimitation of the range of economic agents, to individuals, firms and governments, is 
based on a notion of persons as self-standing, asocial, not formed by and also engaged 
in forming cultures and groups: families and communities at various levels. Yet those 
groups better fit the presumptions of economics: the ability to scan and know their 
environment and to bear all the costs and benefits of their actions. They are ignored 
because if economics took them seriously it would lose its determinacy—for behaviour 
then emerges out of discursive interaction at and between these levels of agency and 
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through culture modification—and economists would lose their high-priest, econocratic 
role. 
 It may be more fruitful in the short run to support change processes in power-
centres like the World Bank than to concentrate on university economics departments. 
Policy agencies appear more reality-oriented and under pressure to respond to failures 
of their prescriptions, as in Sub-Saharan Africa and post-communist Russia, and to 
unexpected crises such as East Asia 1997. Söderbaum considers that ‘little can be 
expected in terms of pluralism from departments of economics as they stand at the end 
of the 20th century’ (2000: 128). There is too much vested interest, too much rent-
taking from the near monopoly position of mainstream economics, whereas other 
locations, like schools of business studies, often provide better settings for new 
thinking. On the other hand, declining student numbers for economics, especially at 
PhD level, might eventually force change; and, remarks Wallerstein, one cannot 
sensibly abandon the traditional disciplines to the narrower-minded.  
 
A complex eco-system of inquirers 
 
From the examination of both disciplinarity and inter-disciplinarity, I propose a picture 
similar in some ways to Johnson's, recognizing different valid types of work plus many 
feasibility constraints on ID. But I draw more on the critique of disciplinarity and thus 
go beyond him, to look at longer-term restructuring of ideas. 
 We will always need regular communication between a diversity of types and 
styles of work. In intellectual life as in other spheres, we need 'bridging capital' to span 
between communities, as well as 'bonding capital' to bind within them. This bridging 
and communication involve a variety of networks and roles and some shared 
'languages'. 
 (1) By networks I refer to organizational and inter-organizational linkages and 
meeting places, as well as to their members and informal contact. We need ID work 
both in distinct centres, as of development studies, and as a leavening factor within the 
disciplines (Klein, 1996, gives many examples). From ID centres some members should 
maintain links to their ‘own’ disciplines, while from disciplinary centres some members 
should link to ID work. 
 (2) Inter-disciplinary work cannot flourish merely by interaction of disciplinary 
specialists. Two sets of roles which are sometimes disputed yet of considerable 
importance are methodologists and, not least for action-oriented work, broker-
generalists (Easton, 1991). The needed bridgers and synthesizers may be based in one 
discipline (e.g. in the interaction of economics and psychology, Scitovsky in economics 
and Lea in psychology); or, unusually, true masters of more than one discipline (e.g. 
Sen in the interaction of economics and ethics); or hybrid intermediaries.  
 (3) While 'bridges' and 'bridging capital' are useful metaphors, in many ways a 
superior image is that of an eco-system, within which many species and hybrids co-exist 
and interact (and sometimes eat others, or get eaten): a plurality of research activities 
and corresponding intellectual communities, as hinted at by the maps we borrowed and 
extended from Johnson and Wallerstein. A complex eco-system requires a complex 
system of concepts and models to describe and understand it. In Section 5 we try to 
become more precise about types of interdisciplinarity.  
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 (4) Interaction requires mutually accessible and acceptable intellectual frameworks. 
Sometimes a superior framework is not sufficiently accessible and acceptable to others 
whose cooperation is needed. Scitovsky's striking work to draw from psychology a 
more empirically grounded basis for consumer and welfare theory apparently demanded 
too much adjustment by economists. It had impact not in economics but in a new cross-
disciplinary enclave, economic psychology. Possibly social exclusion theory includes 
better social analysis than do social capital theory or capabilities theory yet lies beyond 
the reach of most economists. Inferior theories might sometimes function better as 
bridges. In Section 6 we will ask how far particular research programmes might lead 
economics into the social world.  
 
5. A FULLER MAPPING: I.D. VARIANTS DEFINED  
  
‘Interdisciplinarity' can be a problematic label. First, it has become a hate-term to 
opponents of cafetaria education. Second, 'inter-' connotes between, but not all usage 
respects this. These first two problems might be transcended, but thirdly, even if we 
respect the connotation, many forms and outcomes of the relations between disciplines 
are possible (Klein, 1996). Operating with just one or with an undifferentiated set of 
labels often brings inconsistency or reductionism, the equation of ID with just one 
variant. We need a clear and fuller set of terms. 
 Figure 3 suggests some of the possible relationships between disciplines. 
 
Figure 3: Relationships 
between disciplines 
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All of these relationships sometimes occur. Klein (1996:22-3) records corresponding 
terms like ‘trading zone’, `pidgin’ and ‘creole’ in the literature. The relationships 
somewhat mirror those between nations; and just as most nations’ history books high-
light their victories and pass more quickly over defeats, disciplines tend to downplay 
their own failings.  
Which of these relationships fit the ID label? According to Webster’s and Col-
lins' Dictionaries the adjective interdisciplinary means 'involving two or more disci-
plines'. Universities involve many disciplines, so by this definition they are ID, even if 
the disciplines ignore each other except when they meet in management committees. 
The Oxford Dictionary is more helpful: interdisciplinary means ‘of or between more 
than one branch of learning’. This matches the prefix ‘inter-‘, which means 'between, 
among (e.g. intercontinental); or mutually, reciprocally (interbreed)' and suggests ex-
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change. (See also Karlqvist, 1999.) Furthermore, we have a better term already, 'multi-
disciplinary', to describe constructive relationships which involve only separate contri-
butions without interaction. 
 The noun, interdisciplinarity, could then similarly be variously used, to mean: 1. 
the actual state of relationships between disciplines, even if this is to ignore each other 
or fight; more narrowly, 2. constructive relationships between disciplines, including 
non-interactive complementarity; or 3. active relationships between disciplines, even if 
antagonistic; and narrowest, 4. co-operative relationships in which disciplines learn 
from each other, to improve themselves or do new things together, even to build new 
fields. Cases 1 and 2 would be covered by Webster’s definition, and much American 
usage includes a weak variant of case 2: any combination of courses, or academics, 
from more than one discipline. Interdisciplinary Studies programs in American colleges 
allow students to combine diverse topics rather than fulfil the prerequisites for further 
specialized study as many academics prefer,. 'Between the disciplines' refers in those 
cases neither to the content of the components nor to interactions between them—the 
disciplines may not relate to others and students may be left to make the links—but in-
stead to their combination and to the location of the programs outside the control of the 
disciplinary departments: in-between. It can mean isolation from, not interaction be-
tween, the disciplines. Derogatory usage of the ID label sems to derive from such a pic-
ture of North American cafetaria-choice study programmes. In a more adequate usage, 
ID means cases 3 or 4, interaction or coordination. Thus Leeson & Minogue, writing of 
creating a Masters in Development Studies at Manchester in the 1980s, record that the 
goal was ‘to create from the many separate offerings a genuine interdisciplinary course 
and not to be content with a mere adding together of a fascinating but uncoordinated 
menu’ (1988: vi).  
 We can extend and modify the set of labels presented in an oft-cited OECD 
report (CERI, 1972).
12
 Let us distinguish the following variants of and successors or 
partners to disciplinarity.  
 
1. Multi-disciplinarity. While ‘multi’ implies only the presence of more than one 
discipline, when contrasted to ‘inter-‘ it suggests that complementary but non-
interacting disciplines are drawn on, as happens in a construction or agriculture project, 
or in some area studies publications, where each discipline makes its separate input, 
often presented in an independently authored chapter. This can also be called pluri-
disciplinarity.13 It involves an uncritical addition of different mono-disciplinarities. It 
does mean though that the member disciplines are less likely to become imperial in 
style.   
 We must distinguish these non-interacting multi-disciplinary cases from all the 
variants below, where there is interaction of disciplines and which hence better fit the 
ID label. Most work calling itself ID in development studies has been MD (Minogue, 
1988). While some development studies journals substantially take interdisciplinary 
articles—like Development and Change, the European Journal of Development 
Research, Forum for Development Studies—many others mainly take articles from a 
range of disciplines, such as World Development and the Journal of International 
Development. An interesting test would be: do economists who publish in World 
Development read many or any of its non-economics articles, and vice versa? 
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2. Open-disciplinarity. Here disciplines interact and seek to learn from each other, 
especially in analysis of a shared issue. Minogue (1988) arrived at a similar usage. 
Berge & Powell use another term but capture what I refer to: ‘researchers identifying 
and confronting differences in perspectives and approaches; not in order for one to be 
[judged] "better"... but for each to learn from, and contribute to others; and hence also 
become more aware of the merits and limitations of their own’ (1997:5). Van 
Nieuwenhuijze too sometimes espoused this usage: ‘In upholding our claim to 
interdisciplinarity…we in fact lay claim to no more than the systematic attempt to give 
second thoughts, perhaps a bad conscience, to the person who trusts that his own 
discipline is all he needs to be a student of development... [to make them] realize the 
need to look across the fence, to see what colleagues in the other disciplines are trying 
to do’ (1978:19).  
 
3. Inter-disciplinary openness and exchange may lead to: 
(a) Interdisciplinary fields, in the sense described earlier, such as public administration, 
regional planning, and development studies. An ID field can involve all the forms under 
#1-3 here, and more, since it works at the crossroads of several disciplines and sets of 
practical demands. Such a field never can, nor indeed should, be integrated by a single 
agreed definition. 
(b) New sub-disciplinary fields, in which a discipline pursues with existing methods 
new problems perceived by learning from other disciplines; exemplified by 
environmental economics. 
(c) Hybrids: here new fields arise with new methods as well as new problems, and with 
cross-disciplinary participation. Ecological economics for example is not only 
economics as attempted by ecologists, or by economists who have read some ecology, 
but by any one who has absorbed an ecology perspective. This involves real re-thinking 
not just extension of an existing approach to a new topic. It insists on pervasive and 
fundamental linkages, complexity and hence a broader perspective. Environmental 
economics in contrast often sticks to mainstream economics' approach of high 
abstraction, with the world treated as disconnected so that the ceteris paribus condition 
holds, sometimes followed by a race to policy conclusions. It has had far more money 
and power behind it (Brasso in Ravaioli: 121-2). 
 Figure 4 identifies more of these hybrid fields and new sub-disciplines. It 
extends McNeill (1999)’s classification of intersections of methods and topics, by 
including also the third of Wallerstein's Triad, political science, and its traditional 
quarry, the polity. 
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Figure 4: An extension of McNeill's map of core- and cross-disciplines 
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4. (a) Imperial-disciplinarity is where an existing discipline tries to absorb or displace 
another. Here the eco-system includes predators who wish to eliminate others, or at 
least to colonize them. ‘...“economic imperialism" is probably a good description of 
what I do' said Gary Becker (Swedberg, 1991:39). His close colleague George Stigler 
rode under the same banner (1984). Their associate James Coleman expected instead to 
absorb economics to sociology, but through reforming sociology by importation in a 
central role of rational choice concepts from economics (Swedberg, 1991). 
 (b) Mega-disciplinarity: here a well-integrated all-purpose social science discipline is 
aspired to; as in rational choice social science and some Marxism), and socio-biology 
(whose more sophisticated versions allow for co-evolution of culture and genetic traits; 
Norgaard, 1994). It will transcend existing disciplines but not disciplinarity. Mega-
disciplinarity might be even more dangerous than disciplinarity if it heightens the hubris 
concerning the knowledge claims made and eliminates counter-perspectives.  
 
5. (a) Super-disciplinarity. 'Super' denotes above, beyond, or over. Here a theory is 
provided that claims to span, locate and delimit a number of competing disciplines, 
indicating how they fit different contexts: e.g. perhaps as in more refined Marxism or 
Mary Douglas's Cultural Theory (CT).14 Sometimes their advocates proceed into a 
mega-mode, seeking to subsume not merely link.  
 (b) Supra-disciplinarity. 'Supra' also denotes above, beyond; but in addition 
transcending. Here a framework claims to locate and delimit competing approaches and 
then guide context- and purpose-relative selection. Emery Roe (1998) seeks to surpass 
CT’s super-bid, by defining a variety of types of theorizing which one moves between 
according to purposes as well as context, with CT as only one such type. This 
transcends disciplinarity because methods no longer determine the selection and 
definition of problems; inquiry is driven by externally defined issues and purposes. 
(Note that CT and Roe deal with approaches, not only disciplines.) 
 
6. Trans-disciplinarity: For the International Center for Transdisciplinary Research 
(CIRET) in Paris, a trans-disciplinary approach goes across disciplines, brings them 
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together, and goes beyond them (CIRET website). This adequately respects the original 
sense of trans-: across, on the other side of, beyond.15 Trans-disciplinarity is necessary 
because ‘there are no “economic”, “social”, or “psychological” problems, but just 
problems’, which do not respect disciplinary boundaries (Myrdal, 1975: 142). The aim 
is to connect and transcend, not make a unified super-formulation.  
 One can also speak of meta-disciplinarity: 'meta-' denotes after, beyond, with a 
suggestion of change of type. Here, as in systems- and some policy analysis, and 
various fields of design, we seek case-specific and purpose-specific framing of issues, 
not a standardized disciplinary frame nor even a wide set of them to choose between. 
(See e.g. Stretton, 1969; Rein & Schön, 1994.) All relevant disciplines are drawn on, as 
tools, not granted major independent status; instead they are starting points, then left 
behind in the process of dealing with real cases, as done also in good historiography, 
good biography, good area studies. 
This gives a dozen or so variants, shown in Figure 5. They are groupable into 
fewer major cases, shown in the right hand column. We could refer to forms 1 through 
6, and combinations of them (which are common), as ID. In this usage, multi-
disciplinarity is not automatically ID. However, some people use the term ID more 
loosely to cover that case (#1) also; while others use it more narrowly, for only cases 2, 
3 and 5. 
 
 
Figure 5: Some forms of disciplinarity and inter-disciplinarity 
 
VARIANT 
 
EXPLANATION 
 
CONDENSED 
CLASSIFICATION 
0. Closed disciplines Islands model Pure disciplinarity (D) 
   
1.Multi-disciplinarity Presence of more than one discipline  
Multi-disciplinarity 
MD 
 
1a. Pluri-
disciplinarity 
Use of more than one discipline: comple-
mentary, additive but not influencing each 
other. 
1b. Poly-
disciplinarity 
Mastery by an individual of more than one 
discipline 
   
2a. Open- 
     disciplinarity 
Some disciplines interchange and learn from 
each other; also cooperate on shared topics 
and tasks. Without necessarily formalizing 
new sub- or cross- or ID-fields. 
 
 
Open-disciplinarity 
OD 
 2b. Bridge-format Interchange is facilitated by a format to mo-
bilize and relate a variety of inputs 
   
3a. ID field A practical problem-oriented field draws on 
various disciplines and may devise its own 
additions; it remains loosely integrated (e.g. 
public administration.) 
ID field 
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3b. Sub-disciplinarity A discipline expands to deal with a new 
field, e.g. one previously in another disci-
pline, with no change of its concepts and 
methods  
Sub-disciplinarity  
 (Cross-disciplinarity A) 
 
3c. Hybridization A new integrated specialized field emerges 
as a hybrid from interaction of problems, 
concepts, methods and theories at the inter-
section of more than one (sub-)discipline  
Hybridization  
 (Cross-disciplinarity B) 
   
4a. Imperial- 
disciplinarity 
A discipline seeks to displace other disci-
plines  
 
 
Mega-disciplinarity 
 
4b. Mega- 
disciplinarity 
Goal of a single integrated social science, 
whether by imperial absorption, fusion or 
some other route  
   
5a. Super- 
disciplinarity 
A theory which purports to show which dis-
cipline fits which context; and a practice 
which draws upon whichever disciplines 
(‘pre-cooked meals’) help in the given case 
 
 
 
Supra-disciplinarity 
 5b. Supra- 
disciplinarity  
A theory which purports to show which dis-
cipline fits which purpose and context  
  
6a.. Trans- 
disciplinarity 
Understand, connect, and transcend disci-
plines 
 
 
Trans-disciplinarity 6b. Meta- 
disciplinarity 
One does not proceed by choosing between 
or combining bits from ‘pre-cooked meals’; 
instead one selects variables and tools more 
flexibly, according to the situation studied, 
using post-disciplinary craft skills.  
 
Why classify, given the inevitable imperfection and incompleteness of any list? 
Because there is remediable confusion both between and within authors, even some of 
the best. Wallerstein et al. oscillate between the terms ‘multidisciplinarity' and 'inter-
disciplinarity', and do not provide a clear terminology. The same applies for Easton, 
Dogan & Pahre, van Nieuwenhuijze and Johnson, amongst others. Johnson for example 
declared: ‘There are people who call themselves interdisciplinarians, implying that they 
can serve as sources of many different kinds of disciplinary excellence. By and large, 
interdisciplinarians fail to furnish hard-core excellence from all the disciplines they 
purport to represent’ (1986:205). But few inter-disciplinarians claim poly-disciplinarity, 
mastery of more than one discipline. Nor need they, since adequacy of grasp for 
particular work demands is instead the criterion (Klein, 1996).16 More of them are ID in 
the sense of openness, willingness and ability to interact, communicate, learn. Indeed 
elsewhere Johnson himself advocated this, but having made ID a pejorative label he 
lacked a term to describe it:  
 It is not asserted here that economists should be multidisciplinarians [masters of other 
disciplines; the meaning he gave to ID on p.205]. Instead, it is implied that economists 
involved in practical problem-solving and subject-matter research should be prepared to 
accept guidance from the philosophies and the different methodological views and 
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techniques associated with the disciplines to which economists contribute (Johnson, 
1986:4).  
They should in other words be interdisciplinary in the sense of open to learn from 
others. 
 
6.  ‘BRIDGING CAPITAL’ - ENGAGING ECONOMICS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE  
 
Stepping stones come before craft skills in interdisciplinarity 
 
Trans- and meta-disciplinarity place higher demands. Albert Hirschman has brought 
concepts from political science and sociology into economics, and vice versa, not on the 
basis of a sweeping manifesto like Becker's ‘The Economic Approach’, but by sensitive 
experimentation. Finding out which imports help in which cases is highly skilled craft 
work. It requires a wide repertoire of concepts and methods, and the ability to select, 
apply and assess. 'There is no master key, no master way of integrating the social 
sciences; it is a matter of case by case invention essentially. This is not satisfying for 
my colleagues or for younger people' (Hirschman, in Swedberg 1991, p.157). Paul 
Krugman (1994) argues that Hirschman has correspondingly founded no school, no 
research program; he has admirers but not disciples.  
 More widely manageable may be identifiable ID frameworks which link or 
transcend disciplinary models; Hirschman himself created the exit/voice/loyalty 
framework. These frameworks can help to fill some of the roles played by a discipline: 
to provide shared foci, language and morale; to structure training; to mould public 
discourse. From such a basis and training some master craftsmen will emerge. Without 
intermediate stepping stones the leap from disciplinarity may be too great. And for 
those who cannot be master craftsmen, worthwhile steps will have been made towards 
cross- and open-disciplinarity. We need ‘a kind of cognitive boundary object (Star & 
Griesemer 1989) facilitating communication across different cultures’ (Jasanoff & 
Wynne, 1998:37). Given the power and insularity of economics, we particularly require 
frameworks that can fruitfully link economists and other social (and environmental) 
scientists. Some of them may be inferior as social science to available alternatives, yet 
superior for this function. Let us briefly note some candidates. The purpose is to 
illustrate this general theme, not make strong judgements on particular contenders. 
 The imperial advance of 'public choice' theory and of rather narrow 
interpretations of 'rational choice' into political science, administration and sociology in 
the past generation has been very significant. These models are accessible and popular 
with many formally oriented social scientists. If taken as offering ideal-types that give 
first approximations for some situations or simply a base-line for seeing how far the 
situations diverge from the model, they are helpful (see e.g. Dunleavy, 1991, and the 
work of Robert Bates and Jon Elster). If they become bridges with only one-way traffic, 
treated as offering accurate renditions of nearly all situations, they become disastrous, a 
degenerate version of ID. (See Stretton & Orchard, 1994.) They are high-risk 
approaches, easily misused. 
 New Institutional Economics is less imperial, for its roots are in organization 
theory and law, not exclusively in transaction cost economics (Oliver Williamson in 
Swedberg ed.). While risks remain of reification of ideal types, compared to rational 
choice theory NIE functions more readily as an arena for two- or more way learning. Its 
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supersession of public choice theory, as main underpinning for the World Bank's 1997 
World Development Report on the State and Development, constituted progress 
(Moore, 1998). NIE remains however limited and limiting in its informational base and 
assumptions (Harriss et al., eds., 1995), as seen in its approach to management of 
common property resources (Mosse, 1997). For Kurien (1996:20) NIE shows the 
futility of trying to graft selected substantive aspects, selected still with priority to 
analytical convenience above realism, on to a neo-classical base. 
 In this context, the appearance of a new star in the (World Bank) firmament—
‘social capital'—has major potential significance, argue commentators whose views 
deserve attention. Abashed by their weakness in creating sustainable development 
projects, some World Bank and associated economists have sought an explanatory 
factor to add to the trio of traditional capital goods, human capital, and 'environmental 
capital'. Impatient with the various interpretations of 'social capital' in other social 
studies, some think these can be fused (Serageldin & Grootaert, 2000) and then 
measured.  
 Despite its limitations, 'social capital' could perhaps be a surprise package that 
brings more of the real world into the mental worlds of the Bank and even of 
mainstream economics. Import of small numbers of anthropologists to the World Bank 
since the late 1980s, aided by Kottak’s argument that more participatory projects had 
sharply higher economic returns, had worthwhile effects in some areas of program 
design. Yet in the mid-1990s the Bank still employed 28 economists for every other 
social scientist (Edwards, 1999). Few World Bank staffers will continue listening if 
they hear an attack on 'homo oeconomicus', but many more will accept a discussion of 
'social capital', remarked one of the economists forwarding such discussion.17 
Anthropologist Steve Rayner observes that, for many economists, 'social capital' is a 
way to talk about the social without yet having to consider society! In the words of a 
leading development administration thinker, 'social capital' becomes the battering ram 
to bring social analysis into economic development (a conference statement reported by 
Desmond McNeill). Unhappy at the inelegance of the concept, Nobel Prize economists 
Arrow and Solow (in Dasgupta & Serageldin, eds., 2000) overlook this ID role, seeing 
only the poorness of fit to traditional notions of 'capital'.  
 Many expectations will probably not be fulfilled, at least when checked by 
others: for reliable measurement, aggregation, worldwide generalizations, transferable 
models, manageable promotion projects. The concept itself might even later disappear. 
The key question is will economists then withdraw to disciplinarity or will there be a 
longer term and deeper impact, after the entry of extra non-economist staff and new 
variables in analysis, which may in time demand and legitimate new methodological 
stances by economists. Found in many circles other than in the World Bank, 'social 
capital' discourse might be functioning as one ID meeting point and vehicle for bringing 
more historically aware, less universalistic, more humble thinking into economics 
(Grahame Thompson, 2000). This would be sufficiently unusual that the forum should 
not be lightly discarded.  
 
Usable frames or mega-pretensions? 
 
Ben Fine (1999) has provided a well-argued critique of Social Capital theory. An earlier 
piece by him gave a similar assessment, albeit somewhat more kindly, of Sen's 
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entitlements approach (Fine, 1998). One can agree with most of Fine's points on the 
content of ‘social capital' ideas, yet note that the sociology of knowledge perspective 
which he uses is reductionist: how such ideas might fit current needs of world capitalism. 
He misses their unruly potential, as a bridge or staging-post in an evolution of thought. In 
the background of some such critiques the implied alternative is a sophisticated Marxism. 
Marxism's great virtues have stemmed from its determination to connect across the 
conventional divisions of thought: to see the social and psychological significances of the 
commodity form; to highlight the linkages from economic power to politics, neglected in 
disciplinary social science (even public choice theory): the power often of money to buy 
police, judiciary, legislature and governors; and much more. Its decline reflects the 
failures, intellectual and practical, of reductionist mega- and super-disciplinary versions. It 
serves better as a source of questions than a set of fixed, clumsy frames and models.18 
 Let us take another example, the ‘cultural theory’ created in the 1960s-70s by the 
anthropologist Mary Douglas. It has been elaborated and applied by others, notably her 
co-workers Steve Rayner and Michael Thompson (see Thompson, 2000 for a streamlined 
and deepened version), and prominent political scientists Aaron Wildavsky and 
Christopher Hood (Thompson et al., 1990; Hood, 1998). It figures strongly for example in 
the 4-volume report (Rayner & Malone, 1998) of the Battelle Foundation project on social 
science approaches to climate change, directed by Rayner, which drew on large numbers 
of social and environmental scientists from a range of disciplines. ‘Cultural theory’ 
attempts to provide a super-disciplinary synthesis of many matters, but its simplifying 
character and grand-theory claims might sometimes be a barrier to inter-disciplinary 
interaction. It could become perceived as a cult with a set of too-ready answers, rather 
than a forum where analysts of various backgrounds can find help to pursue their 
questions, not least by talking with each other. Promotion of ID via a theory which makes 
strong claims and is mainly propounded by one school from one discipline would be less 
effective than propagation of a common frame-for-work. More promising is Hood's light 
handling, using the 'theory' as a 'variety-generator' to spawn ideas and options. 
 Entitlements analysis seems to encourage open-disciplinarity: it provides a bridge. 
This framework devised by Amartya Sen for explanatory and policy analysis has attracted 
attention and been relatively fruitful across a number of disciplines and in inter-
disciplinary discussion (Gasper, 1993). This is despite some internal obscurities, 
misunderstandings about Sen's categories by many users, and even their perhaps rather 
limited content as social analysis.19 Sen is indeed an open-minded economist but only 
strongly cross-disciplinary in respect of philosophy rather than other social sciences (see 
his interview in Swedberg 1991; Gasper, 2000b). Yet entitlements analysis has proven 
suitable to help economists, geographers and others pose relevant questions that take them 
beyond their inherited frames. It opens not just conversations within economics, but 
windows beyond. We should accept the inevitability of many lines and styles of 
conversations; and, while situating his or her work, praise anyone who generates sustained 
inter-disciplinary conversation. 
 A recent example of influence is in the ‘environmental entitlements’ work by 
Leach, Mearns and Scoones (1997, 1999), a team at IDS Sussex drawn from 
anthropology, human geography and agriculture. They and collaborators from Ghana, 
India and South Africa report that they found entitlements analysis helpful in forcing 
them to systematically consider a whole range of connections they would probably 
otherwise have neglected.   
  
26 
 Sen's capability approach, adopted by Mahbub Ul Haq as basis for the UN's 
Human Development work, has functioned in a similar way. By forcefully directing 
attention to other determinants of quality of life besides commodities, it has contributed 
to broadening development economics and increased inter-disciplinary co-operation 
(Gasper, 1997 & 2000b). 
 Entitlements and capability analysis are examples of flexible formats that yet 
give considerable help in identifying factors to consider. Also important for ID work, in 
helping to avoid a priori exclusions of factors and issues, are formats for analysing and 
constructing policy arguments (see e.g. Dunn, 1994; Gasper, 1996). These can provide 
both space and specific prompts to bring in issues. They can help us to ask, in the 
example we saw earlier, about private education's comparative impacts on 
nationbuilding, the brain-drain, and willingness to work in priority sectors, not only on 
graduates' earnings. The less pre-emptive and more exploratory is problem formulation, 
the more trans-disciplinary will be the endeavour (see e.g. Brewer ed., 1999). 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
Development studies has relied in considerable part on the case for interdisciplinarity, 
to justify its distinctive organizational space. Yet it has often become absorbed in 
routine and paid little attention to the theory and practicalities of ID. One widely sees 
ID, the interaction between disciplines, confused with the mastery of multiple 
disciplines, or the mere addition of disciplinary contributions without substantial 
mutual influence, or identified with an extreme variant like mega-disciplinarity.  
 This study has highlighted and tried to respond to needs for sharper concepts, a 
pluralistic picture of valid relationships, non-utopianism about ID, and practicable 
measures for shorter- and longer-run progress. We must distinguish multiple modes and 
purposes of social analysis, and employ a more complex ecology of the social sciences, 
such as sketched above. This includes being clear on the roles and roots as well as 
limits of disciplinarity, and observing the variety of types of multi- and inter-
disciplinarity. We have in particular to strengthen effective, enriching collegial 
interaction between economists and others. Practicable measures include promotion of 
‘bridging capital', notably intellectual formats attractive across groups, to counteract the 
‘bonding capital’ within disciplines. 
 In the shorter term, as suggested by Johnson and Perkins, inter-disciplinary 
situation analysis and cooperation on policy related-cases are typically more feasible 
and sometimes more important than inter-disciplinary theory building. Recognition of 
broker- and liaison roles, in decisions on posts, training and funding, can help. In the 
longer-term, multi- and especially, inter- disciplinary education are probably vital for 
better ID in research and for softening monogamous bonds of allegiance and identity. 
Joint degrees, or at least substantial Minors, should be the norm in social sciences, 
Foster-Carter suggests. As well as providing intellectual resources, they raise the 
readiness and felt legitimacy for later ID.  
 I have emphasized that whatever the time perspective we need frameworks that 
open and facilitate inter-disciplinary conversation, and offer attractive concrete 
activities. The ‘salutary’ or ‘avenging angel' approach to ID—‘Countering my dear 
colleague’s ignorance and grotesquely crude assumptions about topic X’—may be less 
effective than the 'Getting to Yes' approach: aiming to jointly generate new activities 
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and insights that transcend and benefit all the starting points. The urgency of issues of 
environment and development provides one opportunity for this, and by involving 
natural scientists and many others keeps the division between economists and other 
social scientists helpfully in perspective.  
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 See e.g. the website of the Association for Integrative Studies.  ID can stand in this paper for either inter-
disciplinarity or interdisciplinary, depending on context; similarly for MD. 
2
 The three-fold classification of purposes matches that in Sigma Xi (1988). Johnson added a third dimen-
sion: types of philosophical orientation. For economics he distinguished logical positivism, normativism and 
pragmatism. Thus he presented a 3x3x3 cube of types of research (1986: xvii), with illustrations for each 
cell. 
3
 The term is used in the same way by Klein (1996) and Salter & Hearn (1996), though they do not discuss 
these two examples. 
4
 These remarks draw from my review of Hettne's 1995 edition (European J. of Development Research, 
1996(2)). 
5
 In contrast, the conventional stance a generation back was that ‘interdisciplinary studies (IDS) are more 
strongly indicated in less developed countries… because the interactions among variables normally dealt 
with by separate disciplines are unusually strong’ (Lipton, 1970:5). In fact, IDS was hardly indicated at 
all for the North: first, social science divisions supposedly ‘correspond to the division of variables into 
sets that can safely be treated as "nearly independent" in the cultures for which the SDS [single discipline 
specialisms] were designed: those of rich countries’ (ibid: 7); and second, Northern social scientists al-
legedly could grasp the psychology (‘rely quite plausibly on empathy with’, p.10) of Northern agents, 
unlike that of under-studied and alien Southerners, and could specify their models accordingly. 
6
 The Oxford English Dictionary traces the term ‘discipline’ to the Latin discipulus, meaning disciple. 
Salter & Hearn (1996; and sources therein) show how this reflects the history of the European university. 
7
 C.T. Kurien (1996) gives a similar characterization of a Newtonian style adopted by neo-classical 
economics to study ‘the economy’.  
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8
 For example: (1) Lipsey’s best-selling An Introduction to Positive Economics (1975 edition) did not 
acknowledge the existence of other social science disciplines. It opened instead with a long extract from 
William Beveridge on the aspiration to be like physics. The 8
th
 edition does not mention other disciplines 
at all (Lipsey & Chrystal, Positive Economics, 1995). (2) Joseph Stiglitz & John Driffil’s Economics 
(2000 edition) is equally blank on other social sciences or humanities. (3) Samuelson’s Economics (1976 
edition) acknowledged in a few sentences the presence of bordering, indeed overlapping, fields of study - 
in a section entitled ‘The Queen of the Social Sciences’. The section, topic and acknowledgement had 
disappeared by the 1992 edition (by Samuelson and Nordhaus). Fine (1999a) argues that mainstream 
economics’ indifference to other disciplines matches its active intolerance to alternative approaches with-
in the discipline. 
9
 Salter & Hearn (1996) is a valuable source, from ID work in many fields in Canada, though not devel-
opment studies. 
10
 The Centre for Development and Environment at the University of Oslo involves all its graduate stu-
dents in the Centre’s interdisciplinary projects, with significant benefit.  
11
 We need more sociological and psychological studies, and self-analyses, of economists and the eco-
nomics discipline, for their importance is not matched by the relatively little work so far. Note the con-
firmed finding (Frank et al., 1993) that in America economics students both begin and become more self-
ish than other students; and work by e.g. David Colander, Arjo Klamer, and Deirdre McCloskey.  
12
 The CERI report contrasted ‘multi-‘, ‘inter-‘; ‘pluri-‘ (for juxtaposition of related disciplines) and 
‘trans-‘disciplinarity.. 
13
 The prefixes pluri- and poly- differ only in provenance: the former Latin, the latter Greek. I allocated 
them in Figure 5 below in light of the familiar concept ‘polymath’. 
14
 ‘Cultural Theory’ claims that we can helpfully understand the range of viewpoints on almost any issue 
of social organization in terms of four perspectives which are permanent contenders, and whose weak-
nesses in each case reinforce the other perspectives. One stock viewpoint is ‘hierarchist’, reflecting ac-
ceptance of high group loyalties and high regulation of individual behaviour (high group – high grid); the 
second is ‘individualist’ (low group – low grid); the third is ‘egalitarian’ (high group – low grid); the 
fourth is ‘fatalist’ (low group - high grid) (Thompson et al., 1990; Hood, 1998). 
15
 The 1972 OECD report in contrast used ‘trans-disciplinary‘ to mean mega-disciplinarity: subsumption 
of more than one discipline by a common set of principles. 
16
 Klein warns that bilingualism is thus a false metaphor for ID: ‘Pidgin and creole are the typifying 
forms of interdisciplinary communication’ (1996: 220). Thus interdisciplinary PhD research should not 
face the further barrier, beyond the  difficulty of its greater scale and complexity, of subjection to an MD 
style of examination by a battery of disciplinary specialists. Their criteria are often inappropriate: de-
manding maximum elaboration and precision on what are only sub-aspects of an ID study, as opposed to 
a depth sufficient in terms of the whole inquiry. Alternatively, mono-disciplinary theses should be ex-
posed to the critical glare of other disciplines. Many of them will be highly vulnerable. 
17
 This and the following two remarks were made or reported at the May 2000 Solstrand conference on 
Social Capital, University of Bergen. 
18
 Jessop & Sum (2001) argue plausibly for a ‘cultural political economy’, which ‘take[s] the argumenta-
tive, narrative, rhetorical and linguistic turns seriously in the analysis of political economy’, and thus also 
examines ‘the cultural and social construction [and reconstruction] of boundaries between the economic 
and political’ and of agents and their modes of calculation. 
19
 See Apthorpe (1999). 
